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Abstract 
Purpose: We propose a model to present a possible mechanism for obtaining sizeable behavioral 
structures by simulating an agent based on the evolutionary public good game with available 
social learning. Methods: The model considered a population with a fixed number of players. 
For each round, the chosen players may contribute part of their value to a common pool. Then 
each player may imitate the strategy of another player, based on relative payoffs (whoever has 
the lower payoff adopts the strategy of the other player) and change strategy using different 
exploratory variables. Results: Relative payoffs are subject to incentive, including participation 
costs, but are also subject to mutation, the rate of which is sensitized by network characteristics 
(social ties). Values: The process covered by this study is of interest and is relevant across a 
broad range of disciplines that use game theory, including the framework of cultural evolutionary 
dynamics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Game theory, public good game, replicator dynamic, random network, cultural 
evolution 
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 Background 
Many computational simulations in game theory have shown that a substantial fraction of players 
are willing to invest costs (i.e., contribute to a joint effort) to increase their fitness (Rockenbach, 
& Milinsk, 2006). By and large, the rate of incentive (reward) looms credibly enough to increase 
the average level of pro-social contributions. Indeed, the system is itself a public good, and the 
players are often seen as altruistic because others benefit from their costly efforts (Fowler, 2005).  
Conversely, there are always players who take advantage of other’s incentive toward the public 
good called free-riders (or defectors). Free-riding should spread among voluntary players and 
ultimately cause the cascade of the system. A solution to protect this system against defection is 
to refrain the free-riders (Boyd, & Richerson, 1992) because their strategy is taken up other 
players in turn, leading to infinite regress. Moreover, if everyone contributes to the public good, 
risk will propagate without need of an incentive. Their number of free-rider may grow through 
simple cultural evolution, ultimately allowing the defector to invade with impunity. We show 
how a simple step-by-step mechanism can overcome this objection, using one of the most 
common properties, called social learning (imitation, exploration) and social ties in a random 
network. 
 
Model  
Games necessary (payoff calculation): The term game here describes a set of interactions 
among a set of players. The players act according to their behavioral phenotypes, called 
strategies. The moves of the game are decisions stemming from interactions between two (or 
more) co-players with different views of strategy, which translate into payoffs. 
(
𝛼 𝛽
𝛾 𝛿
) 
Most conceptually straightforward games offer only two strategies for each player (up or down 
and left or right) and four outcomes (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿), and they generally involve two players. 
However, a major challenge, even in the simple game, is to be determining how to rank payoff 
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values. This model was able to achieve this by simply defining the dynamics of two strategies 
with four outcomes. Suppose that players must choose between 𝑛 options or strategies. In a 
simple case, player one and player two simultaneously reveal a penny. If both pennies show 
heads or both show tails, player two must pay player one $1. On the other hand, if one penny 
shows heads and the other shows tails, player one must pay player two $1. The game, then, can 
be described as follows; 
                                𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 2  
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 1       
𝐻 𝑇
𝐻 (−1, 1) (1, −1)
𝑇 (1, −1) (−1, 1)
 
The matrix describes, in the ith row and jth column, the pair (𝑎𝑖𝑗 , 𝑏𝑖𝑗) of payoff values. It shows 
that if the outcome is (-1, 1), player one, who here chooses the row of the payoff matrix, would 
have done better to choose the other row. On the other hand, if the outcome had been (1, -1), it is 
player two, the column player, who would have done better to switch. Players one and two have 
diametrically opposed interests here.  
This is a very common strategic situation in games. During a game of soccer, in a penalty kick, if 
the striker and keeper are mismatched, then the striker is happy, but if they are matched, the 
keeper is happy. This logic applies to many common preference situations, and an efficient way 
to represent these dynamics is to let a player decide to implement a strategy with a given 
probability.  
𝑥 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛), 𝑥1 ≥ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥1 + ⋯ +  𝑥𝑛 = 1 
Where the probability distribution presents two or more pure strategies, among which players 
choose randomly, denoted as the set of all probability distributions of such mixed strategies, in 
this way; 
𝑝𝑟(𝑥1) + 𝑝𝑟(𝑥2) + ⋯ + 𝑝𝑟(𝑥𝑛) = 1 = 100% 
𝑝𝑟(𝑥𝑖) ∈ [0,1] 
For all events, the player expects to be happy half of the time and unhappy half of the time.  
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                                𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 2  
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 1       
𝐻(.5) 𝑇(.5)
𝐻(.5) (−1, 1) (1, −1)
𝑇(.5) (1, −1) (−1, 1)
 
It does not matter what the players do because they cannot change the outcome, so they are just 
as happy to flip a coin (in the coin game) or choose one direction of two (in soccer). The only 
question is whether one is able to anticipate the decision of the other player. If striker knows that 
keeper is playing heads (one direction of two), the striker will avoid heads and play tails (the 
other direction of the two). However, we cannot usually guess the coin flipping if we change the 
the payoff to provide a different outcomes. As a matter of facts, if the game expands to the 
following arbitrarily mixed payoff conditions {𝐴 > 𝐵 > 𝐶},  
                                         𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 2  
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 1       
𝐿𝑒𝑓𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡
𝑈𝑝 (𝐵, 𝐴) (𝐶, 𝐶)
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 (𝐶, 𝐶) (𝐴, 𝐵)
 
A player’s expected utility is as follows: 
σu =
b − c
a + b − 2c
, a + b − 2c > 0 
σu =
b − c
a + b − 2c
,        b − c > 0, a + b − 2c > 0 
σu =
b − c
a + b − 2c
, a + b − 2c > b − c, a > c 
Even in the slightly different payoff related to arbitrarily given mixed-conditions {𝐴 > 𝐵 > 𝐶}, 
the payoff will always be positive for [0,1] in the above conditions.  
Now, with this dynamic, if we determine the probability that each outcome occurs for some 
percentage of instances, the payoff of players one and two appear below:  
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𝐿𝑒𝑓𝑡(
2
3
) 𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(
1
3
)
𝑈𝑝(
1
3
) (𝐵 = 1, 𝐴 = 2) (𝐶 = 0, 𝐶 = 0)
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛(
2
3
) (𝐶 = 0, 𝐶 = 0) (𝐴 = 2, 𝐵 = 1)
 
The probability of each outcome must be multiplied by a particular player’s payoff. 
2/3 1/3
1/3 (
𝐵 = 1, 𝐴 = 2
1
3
∗
2
3
=
2
9
) (
𝐶 = 0, 𝐶 = 0
1
3
∗
1
3
=
1
9
)
2/3 (
𝐶 = 0, 𝐶 = 0
2
3
∗
2
3
=
4
9
) (
𝐴 = 2, 𝐵 = 1
2
3
∗
1
3
=
2
9
)
 
Then, all those numbers are summed together, giving player one’s payoff as follows: 
2
3
=
6
9
=
2
9
+ 0 + 0 +
4
9
= 1 (
2
9
) + 0 (
1
9
) + 0 (
4
9
) + 2 (
2
9
) 
Player one’s earned mixed-equilibrium is {2/3}. Then, player two’s payoff is as follows: 
2
3
=
6
9
=
4
9
+ 0 + 0 +
2
9
= 2 (
2
9
) + 0 (
1
9
) + 0 (
4
9
) + 1 (
2
9
) 
This means that player two’s earned mixed-equilibrium is also {2/3}. Checking for the 
underlying assumption of this game’s probability distribution 𝑝𝑟(𝑥𝑖) ∈ [0,1], it is clear that all of 
these payoffs will always be positive for [0,1] because they all must added in the following way: 
2
9
+
1
9
+
4
9
+
2
9
= 1 
These also satisfy the rules of probability distributions: 
𝑝𝑟(𝑥1) + 𝑝𝑟(𝑥2) + ⋯ + 𝑝𝑟(𝑥𝑛) = 1 = 100% 
This relative welfare distribution derived directly from two by two games will allow us to set a 
fundamental assumption for evolutionary dynamics. 
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Replicator dynamics: Now, let the model consider a population of players, each with a given 
strategy. From time to time, the players meet randomly and play the game according to a plan. If 
we suppose that each player is rational, individuals consider several types of different payoffs for 
each: 
𝑥𝑖 = Pr(i)𝜋(𝑖) 
Where each palyer has the payoff {𝜋(𝑖)}, which shows how well that type (𝑖) is doing, and each 
type has a proportion {Pr(i)}. Then, they choose a certain strategy they consider to be the best 
outcome from the entire population. 
 ?̇?𝑖 =
𝑃𝑟(𝑖)𝜋(𝑖)
∑ 𝑃𝑟(𝑗)𝜋(𝑗)
𝑁
𝑗=1
 
Where 𝑃𝑟(𝑖) is the proportion of the different types, and 𝜋(𝑗) is the payoff for all of the types. 
Here, we consider a population of types, where those populations are succeeding at various 
levels. Some are doing well, and some are not. The dynamics of the model suppose a series of 
change in distribution across types, such that there are set of types {1,2, …, N}, a payoff for each 
type (𝜋𝑖), with a proportion of each as well (𝑃𝑟𝑖). The individual player’s a strategy (?̇?𝑖) in each 
round is given a probability that is the ratio of this weighting to the all possible strategies, where, 
 ?̇?𝑖 is the probability that an individual play will take a strategy times payoff [𝑃𝑟(𝑖)𝜋(𝑖)], divided 
the sum of the weightings of all the different strategies [∑ 𝑃𝑟(𝑗)𝜋(𝑗)
𝑁
𝑗=1 ].  
Thus, the probability that the individual player will act in a certain way in the next round is just 
that action’s relative weighting. Specifically, let’s propose that there are different probabilities 
𝑃𝑟(𝑖) of using different strategies (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑧): that is, strategy 𝑥 has a probability of 40%, 
strategy 𝑦 also has a probability of 40%, and strategy 𝑧 has a 20% probability. That might lead 
us to guess the strategy 𝑥 and 𝑦 are better than 𝑧. However, we could also look at the payoffs 
𝜋(𝑖) of the different strategies. For instance, it might be that using strategy 𝑥, we can obtain a 
payoff 5, using strategy 𝑦 there is a payoff 4, and using strategy 𝑧, players take payoff 6. This 
prompts us to consider what strategy we should use, and the answer depends on both the payoff 
and the probability.  
In this dynamic, the model presented here proposes a description of how individuals might 
choose what to do or which strategies are best. Because after certain move, some will appear to 
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be doing better than others, the ones doing worst are likely to copy the ones doing better. Based 
on the cultural evolutionary assumptions for public goods game, we specified the respective 
frequencies of actions of cooperators (𝑃𝑐), defectors (𝑃𝑑), and loners (𝑃𝑙). The experimenter 
assigns a value to each players; then, the players may contribute part (or all) of their value to the 
game (a common pool).  
Cooperators, ready to join to the group and to contirbute to its effort  𝑃𝑐 n.a. 
Defectors, who join but do not contribute      𝑃𝑑 n.a. 
Loner, unwilling to join the public goods game     𝑃𝑙 n.a. 
Table 1. Strategies of potential players. 
 
In each round, a sample (𝑆) of individuals are chosen randomly from the entire population N. S 
(0 ≤ 𝑆 ≤ 𝑁) out of the individuals participate in the game, paying a cost (𝑔). Each round requires 
at least two (cooperator and defector) participants, and others must be nonparticipants. The 
cooperators contribute a fixed amount of value 𝑐 > 0 and share the outcomes multiplied by the 
interest rate 𝑟 (1 > 𝑟 > 𝑁) equally among all others 𝑆 − 1 participants, defectors are in the 
round but do not contribute values. During the round, the payoffs for the strategies 𝑃𝑐, 𝑃𝑑, and 𝑃𝑙 
(denoted by 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑧) are then determined, with a participation cost 𝑐 and an interest rate 𝑟𝑐, 
based on the relative frequencies of the strategies (𝑛𝑐/𝑁). 
𝑃𝑐 = −𝑐 + 𝑟𝑐
𝑛𝑐
𝑁
, 𝑃𝑑 = 𝑟𝑐
𝑛𝑐
𝑁
, 1 < 𝑟 < 𝑁 
Where 𝑃𝑐 is the payoff of the cooperators, 𝑃𝑑 is the payoff of the defectors, 𝑟𝑐 is the interest rate 
(𝑟) multiplied by fixed contribution cost (𝑐) for the common good. For the expected payoff 
values of the cooperators (𝑃𝐶) and defectors (𝑃𝐷), a defector in a group with 𝑆 − 1 coplayers 
(𝑆 = 2, … , 𝑛) obtains from the common good a payoff of 𝑟𝑐𝑥/(1 − 𝑧) on average because the 
nonparticipants (𝑧) have a payoff of 0 (Sasaki et al., 2012). 
𝑃𝐷 = (𝑟𝑐
𝑥
1 − 𝑧
− 𝑔) (1 − 𝑧𝑛−1) 
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Where, 𝑧𝑛−1 is the probability of finding no coplayer. In the abstract, we can write this as the 
derivative of 𝑧 with respect to 𝑛 for any power 𝑛, 𝑛𝑧(𝑛−1). This is known as the power rule and 
is symbolically represented as the exponent (i.e., 𝑧2 = 2𝑧1, 𝑧3 = 3𝑧2, … , 𝑧𝑛 = 𝑛𝑧𝑛−1). This is 
what it means for the derivative of 𝑧𝑛 to be 𝑛𝑧𝑛−1 and for the population thus to be reduced to 
loners (nonparticipation). In addition, cooperators contribute effort 𝑐 with a probability 1 −
𝑧𝑛−1. Hence, 
𝑃𝐷 − 𝑃𝐶 = 𝑐(1 − 𝑧
𝑛−1) 
The average payoff (?̅?) in the population is then given in this way: 
?̅? = (1 − 𝑧𝑛−1)[(𝑟 − 1)𝑐𝑥 − (1 − 𝑧)𝑔] 
The replicator equation gives the evolution of the three strategies in the population: 
 ?̇? = 𝑥(𝑃𝑥 − ?̅?), ?̇? = 𝑦(𝑃𝑦 − ?̅?), ?̇? = 𝑧(𝑃𝑧 − ?̅?) 
The frequencies 𝑥𝑖 of the strategies 𝑖 can simply be represented by  
 ?̇?𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖(𝑃𝑖 − ?̅?) 
Where 𝑥𝑖 denotes the frequency of strategy 𝑖, 𝑃𝑖 is the payoff of strategy 𝑖, and ?̅? represents the 
average payoff in the population. Accordingly, a strategy will spread or dwindle depending on 
whether it does better or worse than average. This equation holds that populations can evolve, in 
the sense that the frequencies 𝑥𝑖 of strategies change with time. Thus, we let the state 𝑥(𝑡) 
depend on time and denote this by ?̇?𝑖(𝑡), where ?̇?𝑖 changes 𝑑𝑥𝑖/𝑑𝑡.  
 
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the model 
(PGG) with replicator dynamics. Colars indicate 
prototype as their proportion of the 
implementation by cooperators (blue), defectors 
(red), and loners (yellow to green). The dotted line 
denotes their relative frequencies, where defectors 
dominate cooperators, loners dominate defectors, 
and cooperators dominate loners.      
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This model is particularly interested in the growth rates of the relative frequencies of the 
strategies. In other words, the state of the population evolves according to the replicator 
equation, where the growth rate (?̇?𝑖/𝑥𝑖) of a strategy’s frequency corresponds to the difference 
between its payoff (𝑃𝑖) and the average payoff (?̅?) in the population. 
 
Imitation dynamics with updating algorithm: In the cultural evolutionary context we are 
considering here, strategies are unlikely to be inherited, but they can be transmitted through 
social learning (Avital, & Jablonka, 1994). If we assume that individuals imitate each other, 
replicator dynamics will be yielded again. To be more specific, from time to time, a randomly 
chosen individual from the population imitates a given model with a certain likelihood. Thus, the 
probability that an individual switchs from one strategy to the other is given as 
𝑝 = 𝑥𝑖 ∑(𝑃𝑖𝑗 − 𝑃𝑗𝑖)𝑥𝑗
𝑗
 
This is simply the replicator equation, but it describes that a player (𝑃𝑖) making a comparison 
with another (𝑃𝑗) player will adopt the other’s strategy only if it promises a higher payoff. This 
switch is more likely if the difference in payoff is a function of the frequencies of all strategies, 
based on pairwise interactions (Traulsen, & Hauert, 2009): The focal individual compares its 
payoff (𝑃𝑖 = 𝜋𝑓) with the payoff of the role individual (𝑃𝑗 = 𝜋𝑟), and then the focal individual 
chooses to imitate (or not) the role individual given the following: 
𝑝 = [1 + 𝑒−𝛽(𝜋𝑟−𝜋𝑓)]
−1
, 𝛽 = 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 
This mechanism holds the factorial for payoff, that is, how many combinations of 𝑟 objects can 
we take from 𝑛 objects:  
𝑛! = ∏ 𝑘,
𝑛
𝑘=1
  →    𝑛𝐶𝑟 = 𝑛!/𝑟! (𝑛 − 𝑟)! 
with the Gillespie algorithm (stochastic dynamic) for updating the system (𝑎𝑟−1/ 𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑡 < 𝑧1 <
𝑎𝑟/𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑡).  
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Figure 2.1. Simulation 1 (prototype) with the replicator dynamics: The plot on the left-hand side 
shows a well-mixed population with a finite number of strategies [cooperators (blue arrow), 
defectors (red arrow), and loners (yellow arrow)] with incentive. The parameters are as follows: 
N = 5, c = 1, u = 1e-10, g = 0.5, and interest rate r = 3. The plot on the right-hand side shows the 
categorized oscillation of the strategies (cooperators = blue, defectors = red, and loners = 
yellow). 
 
Cooperator         C n.a. 
Defector         D n.a. 
Loner          L n.a. 
Table 2.1. Strategies of potential players (C: cooperation; D: defection; L: no participation). 
 
Parameters Number of individuals     M 100 
  Number of samples      N 5 
  Rounds per generation     tt 1 
  Number of generations     t 10,000 
  Participation cost      g 0.5 
  Investment of participation     c 1 
  Participation benefit      r 3 
  Mutation rate       u 1e-10 
Table 2.2. Model variables, parameters, and default of the parameter values. 
 
Imitation dynamics    Selection intensity     s 0 ~ 1 
      Imitation probability    pr 0 ~ 1 
Table 2.3. Imitation and exploration of the parameter values. 
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The above procedures assume a well-mixed population with a finite number of strategies that are 
proportional to its relative abundances given that the fitness values are frequency-dependent, 
coexisting in steady or fluctuating frequencies the evolutionary games (Figure 2.1). The 
mechanism is a combination of the rational process and the copying process, or in order words, 
an individual rationally chooses from a nearby individual because it seems that it would affect 
successful outcomes. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Replicator dynamics with parameters (participation cost). Plots of the left, and right 
upper are with participation cost (g): Parameters: n = 5, r = 3, c = 1, u = 1e-10, participation cost 
g = 2. The right bottom plot shows g = 3. Both plots on the right-hand side show the categorized 
oscillation of the strategies (cooperators = blue, defectors = red, and loners = yellow). 
 
The simulation in Figure 2.2 shows that he system settles into different effects on the 
intermediate interest rate, with participation costs. As the interest rate increases (𝑟), it prompts 
the population to undergo stable oscillations relative to a global attractor, where the players 
participate by contributing to the public good. However, if that contribution is too expensive, that 
is, if the participation cost is 𝑔 ≥ (𝑟 − 1)𝑐 + 𝑙 for rewarding, or 𝑔 ≥ (𝑟 − 1)𝑐 for punishing, the 
players will not opt to participate (Figure 2.3). In this scenario, nonparticipation becomes the 
global attractor (the right bottom plot on the Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.3. Cultural evolutionary dynamics with incentive. Parameters: N=5, c=1, u=1e-10, 
g=0.5, interest rate r = 3 (plot on the left), and r = 1.8. (plot on the right), with individuals 
attracted individuals by the social trap. Both plots show the categorized strategies (cooperators = 
blue, defectors = red). 
 
Replicator-mutator dynamics: Not all learning is learning from others. We can also learn from 
our own experience. The dynamics of the replicator equation describes selection only, not drift or 
mutation. An intelligent player might adopt a strategy, even if no one else in the population is 
using it, if the strategy offers the highest payoff. Dynamics can also be modified with the 
addition of a small, steady rate of miscopying for any small linear contribution that exceeds the 
role of dynamics. As a result, the stability of the system changes, making the system structurally 
unstable. This can be interpreted as the exploration rate, and it corresponds to the mutation term 
in genetics (Sigmund, De Silva, Traulsen, & Hauert, 2010). Thus, by adding a mutation rate with 
a frequency-dependent selection, we expect that the impact of mutations can show a more 
general approach to evolutionary games, without explicit modelling of their origin (Nowak & 
Sigmund, 2004).  
𝑑𝑥𝑖
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑥𝑖(𝑃𝑖 − ?̅?) + 𝜇(1 − 𝑥𝑖) − 2𝜇𝑥𝑖 
In the set of model, both of those dynamics are in play, where individuals are both copying more 
prominent strategies and copying strategies that are doing better than the others. The fate of an 
additional strategy can be examined by considering the replicator dynamics in the augmented 
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space (mutation) and computing the growth rate of the fitness that such types get in the case of 
evolution (Figure 3). The mechanism holds in the ordinary differential equation, namely, a 
differential equation containing one or more function s of an independent variable and its 
derivatives: 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑥
,
𝑑2𝑦
𝑑𝑥2
, … ,
𝑑𝑛𝑦
𝑑𝑥𝑛
, 𝑥 = 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒, 𝑦 = 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦 =
𝑓(𝑥)𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑥] for updating the system .  
 
High 
 
 
↑ 
 
 
Incentive 
 
 
↓ 
 
 
Low 
    Weak             ←              Mutation             →             Strong 
                   
                   
 
Figure 3. Cultural evolutionary dynamics with replicator-mutator dynamics. The parameters of 
the upper plots are n=5, c=1, g=0.5, r=3, u=1e-10 (left), and u=1e-1 (right). The bottom plots 
have n=5, c=1, g=0.5, r=1.8, and u=1e-10 (left), u=1e-1 (right). Colars indicate prototype as their 
proportion of the implementation by cooperators (blue), defectors (red), and loners (yellow to 
green).  
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Cooperator         C n.a. 
Defector         D n.a. 
Loner          L n.a. 
Table 3.1. Strategies of potential players (C: cooperation; D: defection; L: no participation). 
 
Parameters Number of individuals     M 100 
  Number of samples      N 5 
  Rounds per generation     tt 1 
  Number of generations     t 10,000 
  Participation cost      g 0.5 
  Investment of participation     c 1 
  Participation benefit      r 3 
  Mutation rate       u 1e-10 
Table 3.2. Model variables, parameters, and default of the parameter values. 
 
Imitation dynamics    Selection intensity     s 0 ~ 1 
      Imitation probability    pr 0 ~ 1 
 
Exploration dynamics    Exploration probability     pe 0 ~ 1 
      Mean for normally increment   mu 0 ~ 1 
      Standard deviation for normally increment  sigma 0 ~ 1 
Table 3.3. Imitation and exploration of the parameter values. 
 
Figure 3 indicates that mutation has a significant effect on the transition of strategies. The system 
settles into the different effects of the intermediate mutation rate. As it decreases, the red 
individuals appear at lower rates (plot of the left side). This prompts players to participate by 
contributing to the public goods. If, on the other hand, as long as the mutation rate is high 
enough, nonparticipation becomes a global attractor; selfish players continually defect by 
refraining from contributing (right-hand plot). 
 
Replicator-mutator including network dynamics: Current models currently proposed cannot 
explain cooperation in communists with different average numbers of social ties. To impose the 
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social ties as a parameter, the primary feature of a random graph (Erdos & Rényi, 1959) was 
used for network characteristics, as follows;  
First, individuals in the model considered as vertices (fundamental element drawn as a 
node), and sets of two elements are drawn as a line connecting two vertices (where lines are 
called edges) (Figure 4.1’s left-hand side). Nodes are graph elements that store data, and 
edges are the connections between them, but the edges can store data as well. The edges 
between the nodes can describe any connection between individuals (called adjacency). The 
nodes can contain any amount of data with the information we decide to store in this 
application, and the edges include data on the strength of connections.  
Networks have additional properties, in that edges can have a direction, meaning the 
relationship between two nodes only applies only in one direction, not the other. A directed 
network is the term for a network where shows a direction. In the present model, however, 
we used an undirected network, featuring edges with no sense of direction because with a 
network of individuals and edges that indicate two individuals who have met, directed edges 
might be unnecessary. Another essential property of this structure is connectivity. A 
disconnected network has some vertex (nodes) that cannot be reached the other vertices 
(Figure 4.1’s right-hand side).  
Nodes (vertices) 
 
Lines (edges) 
 
Disconnected
 
Connected
 
Figure 4.1: Schematic representation of the nodes and lines (left-had side), and connectivity 
(right-hand side). 
 
A disconnected network might feature one vertex that is off to the side has no edges. It 
could also have two so-called connected components, which from a connected network on 
their own but have no connection between them. Thus, a connected network has no 
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disconnected vertices. This could be a criterion for describing a network as a whole, called 
connectivity. The fulfillment of the criterion would depend on the information contained in 
the graph, usually controlled by (n, p).  
An object-oriented language was used to allow the creation of vertex and edge objects and 
give each of them a property. A vertex could by identified by the list of edges that it is 
connected to, and the reverse would be true for edges. However, operations involving 
networks might be inconvenient if we must search through vertex and edge objects. Thus, 
we represent connections in networks that simply used a list of edges (Figure 4.2’s left-hand 
side).  
The edges themselves are each represented with an identifier of two elements (1,2). Those 
elements are usually numbers corresponding to the ID numbers of vertices. Thus, in the end, 
this list simply shows two nodes with an edge between them, and an edge list is a list that 
encompasses all smaller lists. Because the edge list contains a list of other lists, it is 
sometimes called a two-dimensional list. We represent the edge list in a network as an 
adjacency list. Our vertices normally exhibit ID number that corresponds to the index in an 
array (Figure 4.2’s right-hand side).  
 
 Edge list (2D) 
[[0,1], [1,2] 
[1,3], [2,3]]  
Adjacency list (2D) 
 0=(0,1), 1=(1,2), 
2=(1,3), 3=(2,3) 
Figure 4.2: Schematic representation of the edge list (left-hand side) and the adjacency list 
(right-hand side). 
 
In this array, each space is used to store a list of nodes, such that the node with a given ID is 
adjacent to the index with the same number. For instance, an opening at index 0 represents a 
vertex with an ID of 0. That vertex shares an edge with one node, so that reference to that 
node is stored in the first spot in the array. Thus, because the list contains other lists, the 
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adjacency list is two dimensional allowing us to use an adjacency matrix that is essentially a 
two-dimensional array, but the lists within it are all the same length. 
Application (social ties): Due to the collection of nodes influenced by connection 
probabilities corresponding to the adjacency list, the distribution of the connection in the 
network was used for the social ties (probability of degree) as below: 
∑ deg(𝑣) =
𝑣∈𝑉(𝐺)
 deg(𝑣1) + ⋯ + deg(𝑣𝑛) = 2|𝐸(𝐺)| 
In this context, one might wonder whether some groups of individuals interact with each other 
more and more often than with others and under which conditions social beings are willing to be 
cooperative. Moreover, they must be able to adjust their own changes to thrive. To understand a 
cooperative network of interaction, both the evolution of the network and the evolution of 
strategies within it should be considered simultaneously.  
𝑑𝑥𝑖
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑥𝑖(𝑃𝑖 − ?̅?) + [𝜇(1 − 𝑥𝑖) − 2𝜇𝑥𝑖] ∗ [
2 − 𝑡
𝑁
𝑁(𝑁 − 1)
2
] 
Where 𝑡 represent the social ties [𝑡 = 2|𝐸(𝐺)|] between individuals, and 𝑁 is the nodes (Santos, 
Pacheco, & Lenaerts, 2006) of the sample of the population. (2 − 𝑡)/𝑁  denotes the actual 
connection in the network (𝐴𝐶), 𝑁(𝑁 − 1)/2 denotes the potential connection in the network 
(𝑃𝐶). A potential connection (𝑃𝐶 = 𝑁(𝑁 − 1)/2) is a connection that could potentially exist 
between two individuals, regardless of whether or not it actually does. One individual could 
know another individual, and this object could connect to that one.  
Whether the connection is actually there is irrelevant when we are talking about a potential 
connection. By contrast, an actual connection (𝐴𝐶 = (2 ∗ 𝑡)/𝑁) is one that actually exists ( 𝑡 
=social ties), where this individual does know that one, and this obejct is connected to that one. 
In relation to these small linear contributions and their dynamics, structural instability can be 
interpreted as the characteristics of the network, influenced by the exploration rate, which 
corresponds to the idea of mutation in genetics.  
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Grouping the network characteristics that incorporate the decisions of individuals through 
establishing new links or giving up existing links (Traulsen, Hauert, De Silva, Nowak, & 
Sigmund, 2009), we propose a version of evolutionary game theory and study the dynamical 
coevolution of individual strategies and network structure. In this model, the dynamics operate 
such that the population moves over time as a function of payoffs, and proportions based on the 
replicator-mutator dynamic multiplied its network density (Figure 5).  
Cooperator         C n.a. 
Defector         D n.a. 
Loner          L n.a. 
Table 4.1. Strategies of potential players (C: cooperation; D: defection; L: no participation). 
 
Parameters       Number of individuals     M 100 
        Number of samples     N 5 
        Rounds per generation     tt 1 
        Number of generations     t 10,000 
        Participation cost      g 0.5 
        Investment of participation    c 1 
        Participation benefit     r 3 
        Strength of selection     w 1 
        Mutation rate      u 1e-10 
Table 4.2. Model variables, parameters, and default of the parameter values. 
 
Imitation dynamics    Selection intensity     s 0 ~ 1 
      Imitation probability    pr 0 ~ 1 
 
Exploration dynamics    Exploration probabitlity     pe 0 ~ 1 
      Mean for normally increment   mu 0 ~ 1 
      Standard deviation for normally incrment  sigma 0 ~ 1 
 
Created network       Number of nodes     n 100 
                     Connection probability    p 0–1 
           Calculated social ties (from random graph) t 0–1 
Table 4.3. Imitation, exploration, and created network characteristics of the parameter values. 
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Figure 5. Cultural evolutionary dynamics using replicator-mutator, including network 
characteristics. In the left-hand plot, r = 3, c = 1, g = 0.5, and u = 1e-10. In the center-left plot 
(with network density = ND), r = 3, c = 1, g = 0.5, and u=1e-10 with upper ND = (0.9), bottom 
ND = (0.1). Center-right plot, r = 3, c = 1, g = 0.5, u=1e-10, upper ND = (0.9), and bottom ND = 
(0.1). Right-hand plot, r = 3, c = 1, g = 0.5, and u = 1e-3. The dotted lines show the homoclinic 
orbit for three assessment strategies (with different initial points). U_D denotes an unstable 
region of defection and cooperation.  
 
In Figure 5, the exploration of the individual indicates its significance sensitivity, according to 
the exploratory trait of the mutation rate (Figure 5, left and right). However, the designated 
network density, as the individuals’ social ties, can mediate its sensitivity. This means that when 
network density is high enough against the exploratory mutation rate, individuals are sensitized 
by mutation (Figure 5, center-upper panels) but the network density low, the phase portraits are 
not sufficient to be sensitive to changes in the mutation rate (Figure 5, center-bottom panels). 
This phenomenon of systemic sensitivity to external influence produces a more interesting 
evolutionary pattern.  
 
Evolutionary public good game  21 
 
Model application 
This proposed model for a public goods game represents a highly nonlinear system of replicator 
equations that can be analyzed with purely analytical means. For large incentive (r > 2), stable 
oscillations are observed, but where the cost for participation is too high (g > 1), no one will 
participate (Sigmund, 2010). From this, various combinations of time averages of the frequencies 
and payoffs of three strategies follow. It is found to be impossible to increase cooperation by 
increasing participation costs (or decreasing incentive), which favors defections and loners (Li, 
Jusup, Wang, Li, Shi, Podobnik., ... & Boccaletti, 2018). To promote cooperation, the incentive 
should be increased or he participation costs decreased, which would favor cooperation in the 
significant interest rate as well as in the experimental results (West, Griffin, & Gardner, 2007).  
The simulation in the present model finds that the dynamics exhibit a wide variety of adaptive 
mechanisms that correspond to many different types of combinations, leading to various 
oscillations in the frequencies of the three strategies. The option to drop out of these dynamics 
depends on the mutation rate multiplied by network density as a social influence. In many 
societies, similar situations may occur, where small mutations are known to be a plausible risk in 
every network system and must have a marginal contribution to jeopardising the entire system 
(Helbing, 2013). Additional incentives attract larger participatory groups, but growth may 
inherently spell decline through mutations in any circumstance. However, the average effect of 
an individual’s payoff remains the same, depending on the network characteristics, as if the 
possibility exists in this simulation, in relation to their social ties.  
We investigated how the cooperation and defection changes with network characteristics with 
the involvement of the overall social heterogeneity (Santos, Santos, & Pacheco, 2008). For small 
ties among individuals, the heterogeneity remains low because the players only react slowly to 
social influence. On the other hand, as relationships grow, the dynamics develop rapidly enough 
to promote the social trap of defection (or free riding). Greater cooperation turns becomes 
additional competition at sites, which leads to a reduction in the overall network heterogeneity, 
given the results shown in this simulation. Reflection of the increase in heterogeneity of the 
pattern depends on the underlying societal organisation; much interaction is unable to eliminate 
the common trap and is not quickly eliminated by cooperators (Axelrod, 1986). Thus, the 
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survival of cooperation relies on the individual’s capacity to adjust to adverse ties, even when the 
rate of mutation (or systemic risk) is high. The results indicate that the simple adaptives of the 
social relations that are introduced here, coupled with the public goods game, account for a 
marginal contribution to the mitigating of systemic risk observed in realistic networks. 
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